Sex for Money is Sex for Money: The Illegality of Pornographic Film as Prostitution by Garb, Sarah H.
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 2
1995
Sex for Money is Sex for Money: The Illegality of
Pornographic Film as Prostitution
Sarah H. Garb
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Sarah H. Garb, Sex for Money is Sex for Money: The Illegality of Pornographic Film as Prostitution, 13 Law & Ineq. 281 (1995).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol13/iss2/2
Sex for Money Is Sex for Money:
The Illegality of Pornographic
Film as Prostitution
Sarah H. Garb*
I live in a country where if you film any act of humiliation or
torture, and if the victim is a woman, the film is both entertain-
ment and it is protected speech.
- Andrea Dworkin'
Introduction
The debate over pornography continues to divide the feminist
movement. There is little consensus about whether pornography
should be criminalized: some call the regulation of pornography
censorship, 2 others denounce the very existence of pornography as
a violation of the civil rights of women, 3 and there are numerous
varying positions along this continuum.
This article introduces a viable alternative method for elimi-
nating one aspect of the pornography industry,4 pornographic film.
A carefully drafted prostitution statute directed at the process of
pornographic ifimmaking could circumvent First Amendment con-
* Sarah H. Garb will receive her J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law
School in May of 1996. She would like to thank the board and staff of volume 13.2
for their assistance in bringing this article to its present state, especially Maureen
Cavanaugh, Carla Hensley, Kim Otte, Scott Wolfson, and Carlos Nan. Special
thanks go to Sandra Conroy and Sarah Duniway for their frienship and support, and
Kent M. Williams for the many lively discussions which became the basis for this
article.
1. FNAL REPORT OF THE AToRNEY GENERAL's COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY
199 (1986) [hereinafter, "MEESE COMMISSION REPORT"].
2. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
4. [Hereinafter, "the industry"]. In 1977, the revenues of the pornography in-
dustry were estimated at four billion dollars a year. Caryn Jacobs, Patterns of Vio-
lence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of Pornography, 7 HARV. WOMEN's
L.J. 5,6 (1984) (citing KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAvERY 84 (1979)). In
1978, a weekly audience of two and a half million people saw hardcore films. Id. at 7
(citing BARRY, at 84). In 1978, 400,000 pornographic video cassettes were sold to
private consumers. Id. Pornography is now available on cable television, in porno-
graphic video games, through home computer programs, and on the internet.
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cerns5 and arbitrary line-drawing6 that other attempts to regulate
pornography have failed to adequately address, while at the same
time shifting the focus of the problem to the flmmakers themselves
and the conditions under which films are produced, and away from
the women employed in the industry.7 For meaningful change,
those in power within this industry must be deterred.
Section I of this article explains why the reduction of pornog-
raphy is a desirable goal. Section II analyzes current methods of
dealing with pornography and exposes them as insufficient. Section
III discusses the cases that have attempted to apply prostitution
statutes to pornographic film and theater. Section IV details pro-
posed legislation which would accomplish my goal while acknowl-
edging the limitations of this legislation. In sum, this proposal
presents an alternative that could be implemented by simply ex-
tending current prostitution law to the growing pornography
industry.8
Section I: What's wrong with Pornographic Film?
The desire to attack the pornographic fim industry is based on
a variety of beliefs. Many believe that the industry as a whole
should be eradicated because its product, pornographic media, is
undesirable. 9 Others believe that the process by which pornography
is created is undesirable.' 0 However, for some, the eradication of
pornography is not an obvious or desirable goal."'
5. See infra notes 21-46 and accompanying text.
6. By "line-drawing," I mean that process of deciding what is and is not pornog-
raphy or obscenity-essentially, drawing the line between what is and is not accept-
able film or behavior. For a discussion of obscenity see infra notes 21-28 and
accompanying text.
7. A discussion of the reasons women enter the industry is beyond the scope of
this article. However, I wish to acknowledge that I am operating on the assumption
that a large percentage of women in the industry are "coerced" into it, whether for
economic reasons, or by actual one-on-one coercion. See infra note 76 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of consent.
8. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for information regarding the size of
the industry.
9. See infra note 13 for a discussion of the alleged effects of pornography on
society.
10. See infra notes 15-18 for a discussion of conditions on the sets of porno-
graphic film. There may be significant overlap between these groups.
11. See generally Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of 'the'Feminist Critique
of Pornography, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1099 (1993) (arguing that there is no sound evidence
that pornography leads to violence against women, and the anti-pornography move-
ment is an assault on civil liberties).
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Evidence supports the contention that both the process of pro-
ducing pornography12 and pornographic media13 harm women. The
12. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. In her autobiography, Ordeal,
Linda Marchiano, the former Linda Lovelace and star of the immensely successful
pornographic film Deep Throat, describes being both physically and psychologically
abused by her husband, who coerced her through abduction, systematic beatings,
surveillance and torture. When she tried to leave, her husband threatened both her
life and the lives of her family members. She was forced to ask his permission to use
the bathroom, and while she did, he watched her. Upon her escape and recapture,
she was horribly tortured. She was forced at gunpoint to have sex with a dog. Her
husband prostituted her and those who beat her received her services for free. CATH-
ARImE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 10 (1987) (citing IjNDA LOVELACE AND
MICHAEL McGRADY, ORDEAL (1980)). She appeared in Deep Throat under conditions
of heavy beatings. Though she tried to escape her husband many times, she was
unsuccessful. Jacobs, supra note 4, at 21 (citing LOVELACE AND McGRADY, ORDEAL
(1980)).
13. Research surrounding the effects of pornography on the men and women who
use it has been the source of much controversy. However, studies do show a consis-
tent link between violent pornography and violent behavior by its consumers.
Dr. Edward Donnerstein demonstrated how exposing men to aggressive erotic
films increased their willingness to react violently and to inflict pain upon women.
Jacobs, supra note 4, at 10 (citing Edward Donnerstein, Aggressive Erotica and Vio-
lence Against Women, 39 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 269-77 (1980)).
Men exposed to pornography which contained a combination of both sex and
violence were found to be more likely to be sexually aroused by the idea of rape and
less likely to be sympathetic to rape victims. Jacobs, supra note 4, at 10 (citing
Feschbach & Malamuth, Sex and Aggression: Proving the Link, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
Nov. 1978, at 111, 116).
When polled regarding the direct effects of pornography on their lives, ten per-
cent of the women responding answered that they had experienced and been upset
by a man's attempts to get them to do what he had seen in pornographic books,
pictures, or movies. Jacobs, supra note 4, at 11 (citing Diana E.H. Russell, Pornogra-
phy & Violence: What Does the New Research Say?, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 224
(Laura Lederer ed. 1980)). "Many of these women had been asked to participate in
sado-masochistic behavior and, in fifteen percent of the cases, had been physically
forced to participate in acts that their partners wanted to imitate after having
viewed pornography." Id. (citing Russell at 259).
Women testifying before the Meese Commission reported similar experiences.
When I first met my husband, it was in early 1975, and he was all the
time talking about... Deep Throat. After we were married, he on sev-
eral occasions referred to her performances and suggested I try to imi-
tate her actions .... Last January ... my husband raped me .... He
made me strip and lie on our bed. He cut our clothesline up... and tied
my hands and feet to the four corners of the bedframe. (All this was
done while our nine month old son watched.) While he held a butcher
knife on me threatening to kill me he fed me three strong tranquilizers
.... [H]e beat my face and my body. I later had welts and bruises. He
attempted to smother me with a pillow .... Then he had sex with me
vaginally, and then forced me to give oral sex to him.
MEESE COInssioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 200 (citing Anonymous letter to the
Pornography Resource Center forwarded to the Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography). Another woman testified that she was staying at a man's house when,
"He tried to make me have oral sex with him. He said he'd seen far-out stuff in




conditions under which women work in the industry, 14 without any
consideration of the effects of the end-product, support the elimina-
tion of the industry. Women work long hours15 and are paid in cash
with no hope of job security. 16 Experiencing multiple partners on a
daily basis puts the actors at serious risk of infection and disease.17
The testimony of women in the industry supports this assertion.i
14. Men also "act" in the industry. However, because the large majority of sub-
jects of pornography are women, and women experience a unique exploitation as
workers in the industry, I use 'women" exclusively throughout the article to indicate
all those who "act" in pornographic film.
Further, homosexual pornography exists and may not implicate the same con-
cerns as traditional pornography (targeted to a heterosexual audience). Because
prostitution law does not make any distinctions based on the gender of its actors, or
the audience targeted, I have also chosen not to distinguish on these grounds.
15. A typical work day is 12 to 14 hours long and models can expect to engage in
at least two sex scenes a day. MEESE ComussioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 235.
16. Women are paid by the number and type of sex acts they perform. Some may
make up to $250 dollars a day. They receive no benefits and have no control over the
end product of their work. Further, there is no guarantee that they will be employed
again. Id.
17. Any one model may have twenty-four to thirty-two sexual partners every
month through contacts at work alone. Id. at 236. If every person one comes in con-
tact with has also been in contact with as many partners, contracting a sexually
transmitted disease seems inevitable. Condoms are not an option, and only the
"stars" have any input into decisions regarding their partners. MEESE CoMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 235.
One former model considered herself lucky that she only experienced a herpes
infection that "hung on for years," because she, unlike her friend, did not have doz-
ens of open sores on her vagina. The model considered such infections an "occupa-
tional hazard." Laura Lederer, Then and Now: An Interview with a Former
Pornography Model, in TAKE BACK THE NiGHT 66, ed. note (Laura Lederer ed. 1980).
Another model testified:
At the end of... the day, I was often exhausted and sometimes in tears.
Sometimes I... would show up on location and have to leave. I lost two
jobs because I refused to wear the costumes. They were crusty with vag-
inal secretions and sperm. Women who work in the pornography busi-
ness always have vaginal trichomoniasis or some infection from the
working conditions, which run from bad to simply intolerable. At one
point there was an epidemic of hepatitis ....
Id. at 66.
18. A former model explains her first job:
[Tihere was a woman who had just had a baby two days prior to the
assignment. She was bleeding. She was doing the movie to try to get the
kid out of the hospital. She had this tampon-or two of them-in her to try
to stop the bleeding, even though she wasn't supposed to use tampons
right after birth.
Id. at 61. The same model described posing for an album cover. The picture was a
"crotch shot of me leaping in the air to simulate flying." To obtain that shot, she was
required to jump eighty-seven times off a coffee table onto a "hard mat." To success-
fully obtain the shot she had to resist her natural impulse to break her fall until that
last possible moment. Id. at 62.
The interviewee described going to a set where she was drugged and raped by an
alleged photographer. After raping her in his bedroom, he went to a picture on the
wall, lifted it, and added another tally mark to his apparent list of women he had
"had." Id. at 67.
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In addition to the physical, mental and emotional harm to
which pornography contributes, the existence of pornography is
considered, by some, to be a violation of women's civil rights. An-
drea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon argue that pornography
prohibits women from exercising their First Amendment rights'9
by reinforcing and institutionalizing sexism. While people continue
to contend that the First Amendment protects their access to por-
nography, Dworkin and MacKinnon argue that pornography si-
lences women and impedes their full participation in society. 20
The woman recalled a model who broke her leg trying to pose in a movie of a
nude circus act, a woman who received rope burns from a pose requiring her to slide
up and down a rope, and a woman who suffered a severe allergic reaction to having
her body sprayed with paint. The entire top layer of her skin peeled off as a result of
being painted and because she could not be photographed that day, she received no
compensation. Id. at 66. She also testified about an "agency in Los Angeles [that]
sent a woman out on an assignment with a man who took pictures of how he tortured
her." Id. at 69.
When asked about finally leaving the industry, the woman said, "I was ex-
hausted. I wasn't sleeping at night. I was having nightmares and throwing up. I was
physically sick from the long hours of work, and I was getting bladder infections
from the work conditions and the general uncleanliness." Id. at 67.
In addition to the physical risks of such work, women in the pornography indus-
try experience a myriad of emotional harms. Former models describe themselves as
"commodities" and being treated like a "piece of meat." Women were even referred to
as "fresh meat" and considered themselves "garbage." Jacobs, supra note 4, at 22.
19. In her book, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1981), Dworkin proposes
that pornography keeps women from exercising the rights protected by the First
Amendment. Dworkin and MacKinnon define pornography as "a practice of sex dis-
crimination, a violation of women's civil rights, the opposite of sexual equality,"
wherein women's pain and inferiority do not outweigh men's sexual pleasure. Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon, Frances Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,
in FEMSM UNMODIFIED 163, 175 (1987).
Lauren Robel succinctly summarizes this complex theory: "The assumption un-
derlying the civil-rights approaches to pornography is that pornography is a cause of
sex discrimination in all the areas, such as employment, housing, and access to pub-
lic accomodations, with which civil-rights legislation is traditionally concerned."
Lauren Robel, Pornography and Existing Law, in FOR ADULT UsERs ONLY: THE Di-
LEmMA OF VxoLENT PoRNoGRAPHY 178, 179 (Susan Gubar and Joan Hoff eds. 1989).
Dworkin and MacKinnon assert that the First Amendment operates on the as-
sumption that adults are autonomous, equal, freely acting individuals, and, as such,
are guaranteed freedom of speech. MacKinnon, supra, at 181. However, because por-
nography sexualizes rape, battery, harassment and child sexual abuse, it eroticizes
dominance and submission. Id. at 171. It eroticizes hierarchy and inequality while
institutionalizing male supremacy as something sexual. Id. By making women into
objects, pornography silences them. Objects do not speak. Id. at 182. In this context,
the free speech of men silences the free speech of women, thereby violating women's
rights. Id. at 156. This concept is perhaps best clarified by MacKinnon's query: has
"the speech of the Nazis... historically enhanced the speech of the Jews[?] Has the
speech of the Klan expanded the speech of the Blacks?" Id. at 209.
20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for an explanation of this position.
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Section II: Inadequate Attempts at Regulation
Means currently employed which attempt to curb the use pro-
duction, distribution, and location of pornography, while important
contributions to the battle against it, have only begun to deal with
the problem. This section examines some of those attempts and
their limitations.
Labeling a work as "obscene" is one way courts have tried to
limit the availability of pornography. If something is obscene, it is
no longer entitled to First Amendment protection. 2 1 In Miller v.
California ,22 the Supreme Court set forth the following criteria for
determining whether something is obscene:
(a) whether the average person,2 3 applying contempo-
rary community standards 24 would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the appli-
cable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious lit-
erary, artistic, political or scientific value.25
There are many reasons why this formulation is troublesome.
The Court stated that its intention was "to define obscenity in a
manner that would aid in the prosecution of individuals producing
or distributing obscene material."2 6 However, the application of the
21. Lori D. Hutchins, Pornography: The Prosecution of Pornographers under
Prostitution Statutes: A New Approach, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 977, 978 (1986) (citing
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1987), in which the Court stated that "ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press").
Hutchins' article introduces the idea of using pornography statutes to regulate
pornographic film. It differs from this article in that it makes no significant attempt
to support such regulation as a worthwhile goal, and presents neither a model stat-
ute nor an acknowledgement of the possible shortcomings such a statute may have.
22. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
23. See infra note 27 for an explanation of how the use of the "average person"
standard is problematic.
24. See infra note 27 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
requirement.
25. Hutchins, supra note 21, at 979-80 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 39).
26. Id. at 980 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 25-29).
[Vol. 13:281
SEX FOR MONEY IS SEX FOR MONEY
test has been difficult,27 and has resulted in a decrease in such
prosecutions. 28
Public nuisance statutes are also used to regulate pornogra-
phy. These statutes make it possible to enjoin materials which have
been judicially determined to be obscene.29 A violation of an order
enjoining the pornography results in a contempt charge.30 Prosecu-
tors find such statutes attractive because (1) the burden of proof is
lower than that required for prosecution under obscenity stat-
utes,31 (2) a jury is not constitutionally required because this cause
of action is grounded in equity, 32 (3) defendants are not subject to
27. The Miller test is ambiguous. 'The average person" may or may not be inter-
ested in pornography. While I may find the Victoria's Secret lingerie catalogue ob-
scene, a man who regularly uses pornography may be hard-pressed to admit that the
most hard-core pornography is obscene.
"Community standards" are also difficult to define. One must ask, which com-
munity? In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 125 (1974), the Court held that
the determination of what is obscene as decided by an average person applying
"'contemporary community standards,' lies solely in the opinion of each juror and
not in the opinion of the community as a whole." Hutchins, supra note 21, at 980
n.23. In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the Court held that the "commu-
nity" need not be state-wide. A state legislature may determine the geographic area,
but need not specify a particular community. If no such area is specified, the juror
may determine the community. Hutchins, supra note 21, at 980 n.23.
Because of these ambiguities, appellate review is difficult. Since the trier of fact
is applying community standards as she believes them to be, it is difficult to overturn
a ruling. In United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Material, 709 F.2d 132, 135-
36 (2d Cir. 1983), the court stated that an appellate court would only reverse a lower
court's decision "if there is a terrible abuse of discretion on the part of the fact-
finder." Hutchins, supra note 21, at 980 (citing 709 F.2d at 135-36).
Determining whether something has "serious" value is also an exercise in per-
sonal preference and cultural relativism. One must wonder, important to whom?; of
value to whom? Whether something is obscene, then, ultimately depends on the per-
sonal preference of twelve people selected for jury duty, or on the opinion of the
Supreme Court. Since those in power make the laws, and have access to courts, and
have voices that are heard, it is easy to see how such a relativist definition merely
reinforces the status quo. The fact that the pornography industry is still a multi-
billion dollar industry further supports this assertion.
28. Studies show that the number ofjurisdictions prosecuting under the statute,
and the total number of obscenity prosecutions has declined since this decision.
Hutchins, supra note 21, at 981 (citing Harold Leventhal, Project, An Empirical In-
quiry Into the Effects of Miller v. California on The Control Of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 810, 858 (1977)).
29. Hutchins, supra note 21, at 981. The Miller standard is applied here to deter-
mine obscenity. "When speech is found to be obscene and thus a public nuisance, the
usual penalty is an injunction against further similarly obscene speech. However,
some statutes will permit more severe penalties." Id. (citing Thomas A. McWatters,
III, Note, An Attempt to Regulate Pornography Through Civil Rights Legislation: Is
it Constitutional?, 16 U. TOL. L. REv. 231, 253 n.113 (1984)).
30. Id. at 981-82 (citing McWatters, supra note 29, at 253).
31. Id. at 982 (citing McWatters, supra note 29, at 254 (stating that the burden
of proof when seeking an injunction need only be "a preponderance of the evidence,"
not "beyond a reasonable doubt")).
32. Id. (citing McWatters, supra note 29, at 254-55).
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severe criminal sanctions33 and (4) civil actions are viewed as less
likely to chill speech and implicate First Amendment concerns. 34
The Supreme Court delineated the following test for use in de-
termining whether a public nuisance statute is unconstitutional: 35
First, the burden of proving that the [material] is unpro-
tected expression must rest on the censor.
Second, only a procedure requiring a judicial determina-
tion suffices to impose a final valid restraint.
Third, the procedure must also assure a prompt final judi-
cial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and
possibly erroneous denial of a license. 36
This test has also encountered problems in its application.
Fear of chilling speech due to overbreadth,37 vagueness 38 and the
prior restraint doctrine39 has limited the utility of public nuisance
statutes.
Zoning ordinances are another means used to limit the availa-
bility of pornography.40 While the scope of such ordinances is nar-
row, 4 1 pornography need not be declared obscene to be regulated by
this method.42 These ordinances will only be found unconstitutional
if they are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, [and] hav[e] no sub-
33. Id. at 982 n.42 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 43-44 (1973) (Doug-
las, J. dissenting), in which Justice Douglas commented that sending people "to jail
for violating standards they cannot understand, construe and apply is a monstrous
thing to do in a nation dedicated to fair trials and due process").
34. Id. at 982 (citing McWatters, supra note 29, at 257 n.131.) The assumption is
that if sanctions less severe than criminal penalties exist, more vendors will be will-
ing to "risk it" and therefore less speech will be chilled.
35. Id. at 982 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965)).
36. Id. at 982-83 (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59) (footnotes omitted).
37. A statute that fails to define precisely what speech is prohibited may ulti-
mately stifle speech when a person errs on the side of not speaking rather than risk-
ing penalty. If conduct were specifically defined, the risk of chilling constitutionally
protected speech would be significantly reduced.
38. A public nuisance statute is considered unconstitutionally vague if it does
not meet the requirements outlined in Miller. Hutchins, supra note 21, at 983 n.52.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-25 for the Miller requirements.
39. A prior restraint is one "imposed before the communication takes place, as
distinguished from restrictions of speech imposed by subsequent punishment." A.
GUJNTER, CONSTrTruTONAL LAw 1374 (10th ed. 1979) (cited in Hutchins, supra note
21, at 983 n.53).
40. Hutchins, supra note 21, at 984 (citing McWatters, supra note 29, at 265).
Zoning ordinances allow governments to prohibit pornography shops from locating in
certain areas or "zones."
41. Id. The scope of application is narrower because while zoning ordinances al-
low control of the areas where pornography may be sold, they do not limit amounts
or content. Id. at n.59.
42. Id.
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stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare."43
Such ordinances have made distribution and sale more diffi-
cult for pornographers. However, they merely reaffirm the attitude
that as long as the industry is not somewhere where it can be seen,
it is not harming the community.44 Rather than sending a message
that the production of pornography is wrong or harmful, the stat-
utes reinforce stereotypes about the people who use pornography45
while really only saying "it is not alright to do that here" rather
than saying "it is not airight to do that."46
In 1983, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin drafted
an ordinance based upon their assertion that pornography is a civil
rights violation.47 Proposed as an amendment to the Minneapolis
Civil Rights Code, this ordinance would have allowed a person to
bring a civil suit against the producer, seller, exhibitor or distribu-
tor of pornographic material.48 Although the Minneapolis City
Council passed the statute, the Mayor vetoed it. A similar ordi-
43. Id. (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). The
Supreme Court reaffirmed such ordinances in Renton v. Play-Time Theaters, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986), reh' denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986) (stating that zoning ordi-
nances are "valid governmental ... response[s] to the serious problems created by
adult theaters," while still satisfying the dictates of the First Amendment). Hutch-
ins, supra note 21, at 984-85.
44. Such ordinances really only call for the relocation of the industry. Viewing
this method as a solution ignores the reality that pornography affects society, re-
gardless of whether it is visible. It also ignores the harm done to the women working
in the industry.
45. Such ordinances are motivated by the feeling that "we don't want those peo-
ple in our neighborhood." This reinforces the idea that only "other people" use por-
nography, not my husband, doctor, lawyer, neighbor, lover. This contributes to the
unwillingness to really attack the problem at a systemic level.
46. See supra notes 44 and 45 for further explanation.
47. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of this theory.
48. The ordinance defined pornography as:
[Tihe sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted,
whether in pictures or in words that entails one or more of the
following-
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things
or commodities; or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or hu-
miliation; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual
pleasure in being raped; or
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission
(vi) women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas,
breasts, and buttocks-are exhibited such that women are
reduced to those parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or




nance, based on the Minneapolis Ordinance, was passed in the city
of Indianapolis. It was found unconstitutional.49
The limited effectiveness of these methods indicates that
if something is going to be done to curtail or criminalize pornogra-
phy, it must be something new. My recommendation calls for a pe-
nalization of pornographic fim-makers by extending the scope of
prostitution statutes. This approach avoids the problems of uncon-
stitutionality, vagueness, and fear of prosecution that the above
methods have encountered.50
Section III: Precedent
Prosecuting pornographic film-making as prostitution has re-
ceived little attention in the courts, but pornography and prostitu-
tion have been recognized by the non-legal world as inextricably
linked.51 While some pornographers have been successfully prose-
cuted under prostitution statutes, the case of People v. Freeman52
slowed such prosecution, at least in California,53 ignoring and over-
turning precedent which held to the contrary. 54
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury,
abasement, torture, shown as filth or inferior, bleeding,
bruised or hurt in a context that makes these conditions
sexual.
Hutchins, supra note 21, at 985 n.73 (citing proposed amendment to MInuWPoLS
CODE OF ORDiNANcEs Trr. 7, cHs. 139, 141 (1982) (passed December 30, 1983; vetoed
January 5, 1984)).
49. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind.
1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
50. See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ways in
which other methods are insufficient.
51. One former model articulated this connection when she said, "A prostitute is
just being more honest about what she's doing .... We called what we were doing
'modeling' or 'acting.' Pornography models have the illusion that they're not hooking.
It's called acting instead of sex." Lederer, supra note 17, at 64.
Another model stated, "anybody in the industry knows you are paid per sex act
and not for acting." MEESE CommsIoN REP'oir, supra note 1, at 238 (citing Los
Angeles Hearing, Vol. 1, George, at 84-85). Models admit that thin story lines are
merely vehicles for filming sex. One stated that the movie she was most proud of was
one with "acting in it, a story to it... it wasn't an excuse to have sex." Id. (citing
Interview: Traci Lords, ADULT VIDEO NEWS, Aug. 1985 at 34).
After considering the testimony presented before it, the Meese Commission
stated, "It seems abundantly clear from the facts before us that the bulk of commer-
cial pornographic modeling (that is, all performances which include actual sexual
intercourse), quite simply is a form of prostitution .... [This was] effectively denied
by no one." MEESE CoMmissioN REPORT, supra note 1, at 242.
52. 46 Cal. 3d 419 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1311 (1989).
53. The focus on California law occurs because that is where courts have ad-
dressed this issue. The case law cited in this article is all that exists on the topic.
54. "To the extent that People v. Fixier, [56 Cal. App. 3d 321 (1976)], People ex
rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enterprises, Inc., [75 Cal. App. 3d 523 (1977)], and
People v. Zeihm, [40 Cal. App. 3d 1085 (1974)], hold that the payment of wages to an
actor or model who performs a sexual act in filming or photographing for publication
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Defendant Freeman was the president of a video production
company in the business of producing and marketing "adult
films."55 Freeman was convicted of five counts of pandering (a/k/a
"prostituting")56 for his production of a pornographic film, in which
he paid actors and actresses to engage in "various sexually explicit
acts, including sexual intercourse, oral copulation and sodomy."5 7
Freeman appealed his conviction, first to the California Court of
Appeals which affirmed,58 and ultimately to the California
Supreme Court, where his conviction was overturned.59
Finding that the conduct did not come within the definition of
prostitution,6 0 the court stated, "it is clear that in order to consti-
tute prostitution, the money or other consideration must be paid for
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification ... and [t]here is no
evidence that defendant paid the acting fees for the purpose of sex-
ual arousal or gratification, his own or the actors."61 Refusing to
recognize that the payment of money alone is dispositive was this
court's first fundamental error.
The fact that money was offered by non-participants was dealt
with more satisfactorily in the earlier case of People v. Fixler,6 2
overturned in Freeman. Here the defendants were convicted of
pandering (under the same statute at issue in Freeman)63 for
photographing women engaging in various types of sexual activ-
constitutes prostitution regardless of the obscenity of the film or publication so as to
support a prosecution for pandering., they are disapproved." Id. at 428 n.6. See
infra notes 62-72, 91 and accompanying text for an explanation of the aforemen-
tioned case law.
55. Id. at 422. The court failed to define "adult films."
56. Id. The relevant portion of the California Penal Code provides, "Any person
who: (a) procures another person for the purpose of prostitution... is guilty of pan-
dering." CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(i) (West 1988). "Prostitution includes any lewd act
between persons for money or other consideration." CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (West
1988 & Supp. 1995).
The court relied on a precedential definition of prostitution. "[Flor a 'lewd' or
'dissolute' act to constitute 'prostitution,' the genitals, buttocks, or female breast, of
either the prostitute or the customer must come in contact with some part of the
body of the other for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the customer or
the prostitute." Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 424 (emphasis omitted) (citing People v. Hill,
103 Cal. App. 3d 525, 534-35 (1980)).
57. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 422.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 56 for a definition of prostitution.
61. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d. at 424-25. By comparison, the Meese Commission de-
fined pornography as "material that is predominantly sexually explicit and intended
primarily for the purpose of sexual arousal." MEESE COMMSSION REPORT, supra note
1, at 7 (emphasis added).
62. 56 Cal. App. 3d 321 (1976).
63. See supra note 56 for text of the statute.
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ity.6 4 Using the same definitions of prostitution and pandering used
in Freeman, the Fixler court stated:
There is nothing in statute or case law which would remove this
conduct from the ambit of the statute simply because the money
was provided by nonparticipants in the sexual activity or be-
cause the defendants' primary motivation was to photograph
the activity. It seems self-evident that if A pays B to engage in
sexual intercourse with C, then B is engaging in prostitution
and that situation is not changed by the fact that A may stand
by to observe the act or photograph it.65
Not only did the Freeman court ignore the Fixler analysis, it
ignored the possibility that the film-makers may be aroused by the
content of the films, operating on the assumption that non-partici-
pation precludes arousal. If non-participatory observation did pre-
clude arousal, the entire pornographic film industry would be
bankrupt. The market for such films lies in the very fact that they
do arouse their audiences. Further ignored was the possibility that
the actors were aroused.66 The problem with measuring or proving
arousal was not even mentioned.67
The Freeman court engaged in a First Amendment analysis of
the defendant's conviction.68 Since the film at issue was not deter-
mined to be obscene, the court concluded that it was protected by
the First Amendment.69 Again, the court ignored precedent and
failed to make a distinction fundamental to an accurate analysis of
the issue at hand: the content of the film was not being regulated by
the prostitution statute, rather, the process of its production was
being penalized. 70
64. Fixler, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 324.
65. Id. at 325 (citing People v. Zeihm, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1085 (1974)).
66. It is probably imperative that the actors are aroused in order that the requi-
site sex acts are performed successfully.
67. See infra note 92 and accompanying text for a discussion of this problematic
aspect of the statute as written.
68. "However, even if defendant's conduct could somehow be found to come
within the definition of 'prostitution' literally, the application of the pandering stat-
ute to the hiring of actors to perform in the production of a nonobscene motion pic-
ture would impinge unconstitutionally upon First Amendment values." Freeman, 46
Cal. 3d. at 425.
69. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25 for the definition of "obscene."
70. The Fixier court cited the United States Supreme Court's opinion in U.S. v.
O'Brien for the helpful proposition that, "We cannot accept the view that an appar-
ently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engag-
ing in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968),"
Fixier, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 326. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the conditions on the set of a pornographic film.
People v. Souter, 125 Cal. App. 3d 563 (1981), cites Fixler for the same proposi-
tion, stating "hiere we are not faced with questions which would require scrutiny
under the First Amendment. Instead, our attention is directed to the manner in
which the material incorporated in the film was originally obtained." Id. at 563. See
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There is ample support in the case law for this distinction. 7 1 It
was addressed in Fixier, when the court stated:
The prosecution .... [is] based on conduct and (is] not aimed at
prohibiting any communication of ideas. The matter of ob-
taining the [works] and the ultimate use to which those [works]
might be put are separate and unrelated issues .... [Where a
crime is committed in obtaining the material, the protection af-
forded its dissemination would not be a shield against prosecu-
tion for the crime committed in obtaining it .... The fact that a
motion picture of an actual murder, rape or robbery in progress
may be exhibited as a news film or a full length movie without
violating the law does not mean that one could with impunity
hire another to commit such a crime simply because the pri-
mary motivation was to capture the crime on film. 72
also People v. Kovner, 96 Misc. 2d 414, 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) ("While First
Amendment considerations may protect the dissemination of printed or photo-
graphic material regardless of the manner in which it was obtained, this protection
will not shield one against prosecution for a crime committed during the origination
of the act.").
The United States Supreme Court recognized this distinction as applied to child
pornography in the case of New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), which dealt with
the prosecution of a bookstore proprietor under a statute prohibiting persons from
knowingly promoting a sexual, but not obscene, performance by a child under age
sixteen. Id. The relevant statute read:
A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when,
knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or pro-
motes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less
than sixteen years of age.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.15 (McKinney 1982). In upholding the statute, the court iden-
tified the pornography as a permanent record of the child's participation in sexual
abuse. Jacobs, supra note 4, at 37.
71. People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Art Enters., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523
(1977), also dealt with this issue head on, finding that hiring models to engage in
sexual activity in front of a camera was prostitution. The court found there was re-
ally no speech issue at all, stating, "[no creative communication is involved in the
hiring of hundreds of male and female 'models' to engage in depraved and perverted
sex acts. The character of that activity is not altered by the pretense of photograph-
ing it." Id. The court cited U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), for the proposi-
tion that there is not a limitless variety of conduct that can be labeled 'speech' simply
because the person engaging in the conduct intends to express an idea. Thus, both
the Fixier and People ex rel Van de Kamp courts found that this activity (production,
not product) was not speech and there was no need to engage in a balancing test or
other analysis of First Amendment concerns.
This analysis is wholly consistent with the existence of prostitution statutes.
Society has decided that it is illegal to hire people to have sex for money, and like-
wise, have decided that such conduct is not speech. The fact that this same conduct
is done in front of a camera does not entitle it to special protection, it merely serves
as a record of the illegal activity. The Freeman court failed to see this and engaged
in a lengthy discussion of First Amendment concerns. See supra notes 56-68 and
accompanying text for the Freeman court's analysis.
72. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 325-26.
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The Freeman court ignored the Fixler type analysis73 and
again set out on its own course of First Amendment analysis.74 The
Freeman court alleged that finding the defendant guilty would con-
stitute an impingement of free speech.7 5 The court then attempted
to distinguish the case from a situation in which one hires another
to commit murder, rape76 or robbery for the purpose of photograph-
ing or filming the act, activities which the court conceded could not
be done lawfully.77
73. "The bald conclusion reached by Fixler, and reiterated in the related case of
People ex rel Van de Kamp (citations omitted) .... simply ignores the First Amend-
ment considerations that compel our contrary conclusion here." Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d
at 428.
74. The court utilized the standards set forth in U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), to determine the constitutional propriety of governmental regulation of"con-
duct" which also contains elements of speech. These are 1) whether the regulation is
within the constitutional power of the government, 2) whether the governmental in-
terest is important or substantial, 3) whether the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression, and 4) whether the incidental restrictions on
alleged First Amendment interest is not greater than is essential to the furtherance
of the interest. People ex rel. Van de Kamp, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 530 (citing O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 377). They found that the situation before them did not pass the test
because "the application of section 266i in the manner advocated would clearly run
afoul of the requirement that the governmental interest be unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression." Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 427. In applying the O'Brien test the
court failed to explain what elements of speech were present in the conduct at issue.
They merely stated that the speech/conduct distinction referred to in prior cases was
"untenable." Id. Once again, the court ignored precedent and proceeded down an
irrelevant and arbitrary road.
75. See supra note 68.
76. This analysis ignores the possibility that the making of pornographic films is
rape, because women are not consenting in the usual sense of the word. To say that
one consents assumes that one has a free range of choices, and assumes the one
consenting is independent of the constraints of fear, desperation or emergency.
Caryn Jacobs explores this conceptualization of consent in Patterns of Violence:
A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of Pornography, 7 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 5,
20 (1984). She asserts that those opposed to criminalizing pornography believe that
models enjoy their work because it "easy" and they are well-paid. She argues that
this understanding of work in the industry assumes a "freedom of contract" which is
absent in the pornography context. This freedom assumes that "women, with the
freedom and capability to bargain, advantageously contract with a film producer or
pornographic model agency, simply exchanging the use of their bodies for money."
But, she argues, when you consider the experiences of the models, this view is not
supported. See supra notes 15-18 for a discussion of models' experiences. Her disa-
greement with the free contract-or free consent analysis-is further supported by
research findings indicating women are recruited into sexual exploitation by "physi-
cal force, psychological coercion, economic exigencies, and social circumstances" and
by the fact that economically strapped women, teenage runaways, illegal aliens, wo-
men addicted to drugs and prostitutes constitute the majority of women working in
the industry. Id. at 21.
77. "Undeniably, one cannot lawfully hire another to commit murder, rape or
robbery for the purpose of photographing the act. Murder, rape and robbery... are
crimes independent of and totally apart from any payment for the right to photo-
graph the conduct." Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 429.
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The Freeman court asserted that the alleged "prostitution" in
the instant case was not independent of, and apart, from payment
for the right to photograph the performance.7S The court based that
analysis on the fact that had there been no money exchanged, such
filming would have been legal. This line of reasoning ignores the
fact that prostitution, by definition, depends upon the payment of
money. Indeed, all acts which are penalized under prostitution stat-
utes are wholly dependent on the exchange of money. Without
money, "typical prostitution" (that done beyond the reach of cam-
eras) would not be prostitution either.
The court attempted to distinguish all of the cases upon which
the prosecution relied before finding the defendant not guilty. The
court distinguished State v. Kravitz,79 which involved the owner of
an "adult entertainment" theater showing pornographic movies and
live sex shows.80 The defendant was found guilty of promoting pros-
titution8i by hiring a male and a female to engage in sex acts before
an audience.82 The Freeman court distinguished this case on the
weak ground that it involved "sexual conduct between a member of
the audience and a performer at the defendant's entertainment es-
tablishment."8 The case itself reports the facts as the hiring of one
male to engage in sex acts with one female.84 Further, the rele-
vance of the distinction between a live audience and a film-maker is
unclear. Unfortunately, the court made no attempt to elaborate.
The Freeman court distinguished People v. Maita8 5 on the
same ground.8 6 There also the defendant was convicted for pimping
and pandering by hiring87 women to have sex with "members of the
78. Id. at 429.
79. 511 P.2d 844 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
80. Id.
81. Defendant was prosecuted under Oregon Statute 167.012(lXd) which states:
(1) A person commits the crime of promoting prostitution if, with intent to pro-
mote prostitution, he knowingly:
(d) Engages in any conduct that institutes, aids or facilitates an act or enter-
prise of prostitution.
ORS 167.002(2) defines a prostitute as "a male or female person who engages in
sexual conduct for a fee[,]' while ORS 167.007 provides that "[a] person commits the
crime of prostitution if he engages in or offers or agrees to engage in sexual conduct
in return for a fee."
82. State v. Kravitz, 511 P.2d 844, 845 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).
83. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 430. Apparently, that is as opposed to engaging in
sexual conduct for a fee in front of a camera.
84. Kravitz, 511 P.2d at 845.
85. 157 Cal. App. 3d 309 (1984).
86. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 429.
87. An undercover informant sought employment at defendant's theater. She
was told that employment at the theater would require both nude dancing and real
sex acts on stage, and that these sex acts would include "orally copulating with the
customers and having the customer orally copulate her.' She could work four forty
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audience," who were also hired by defendant. This case is not dis-
tinguishable from Freeman. In both cases, persons were hired to
have sex in front of others. In Freeman the audience was the film-
makers and the potential film viewers, while in Maita it was the
live audience, without cameras.
Defendant contended that the activity88 at the theater was
protected by the First Amendment.8 9 Relying on Fixler,90 the court
found him guilty. They argued that there was merit to neither the
contention that this behavior was protected by the First Amend-
ment,9 1 nor to the contention that it was outside of the scope of the
statute.92 To the extent that other case law supported a finding of
guilt in Freeman, the court overturned it. 9 3
In conclusion, the Freeman court missed the point. Prosecut-
ing pornography under prostitution statutes is a practical approach
for the very reason that the difficult questions of First Amendment
line-drawing are circumvented. Sex for money is sex for money. A
camera does not protect otherwise illegal activity.
minute shows a day, seven days a week. Defendant would pay her $12.40 per show
and she was allowed to keep any tips she might earn. Maita, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 314.
88. This case was prosecuted under the same statutes utilized in Freeman. See
supra note 56 for the text of the statute. The court noted that there was nothing in
the statutes which excluded conduct performed before an audience. Maita, 157 Cal.
App. 3d at 318.
89. Id. at 315. Like the films in Freeman, the shows at defendant's theater were
also found to be non-obscene. Id. at 314.
90. "Fixler unequivocally stands for the proposition that the First Amendment is
not a shield against prosecution under the pimping and pandering laws." Id. at 317.
91. After engaging in an O'Brien analysis, the court stated that the governmen-
tal interest in regulating prostitution was unrelated to speech. Id. at 316 (citing
People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Art Enters., Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 531
(1973)). See supra note 74 and accompanying text for a delineation of the O'Brien
test. The court boldly stated: "No one seriously contends, however, that anything
which occurs upon a stage is automatically immune from state regulation." Id. at
315.
92. Defendant asserted that the activity was outside the scope of the statute be-
cause there was no showing that the sexual behavior was for the purpose of arousal
or gratification, as required by the statute. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying
text for further discussion of this requirement. The court dealt realistically with the
issue, stating, "[aippellant's argument that there was no showing that the [sex] was
for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification merits little discussion. It is difficult
to conceive what other purpose that activity serves, and appellant does not enlighten
us." Id. at 381.
93. See also U.S. v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 739 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that
transporting a woman across state lines to act in a pornographic film fell within the
ambit of law prohibiting transporting women across state lines for the purpose of
prostitution, since "the First Amendment does not constitute a license to violate the
law"); People v. Zeihm, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1085 (1974).
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Section IV: A Legislative Proposal
It is helpful to examine current law when considering a new
statute. Because I am relying on Minnesota's prostitution statute
as the basis for my proposal, I first address it in its current form.
Minnesota Statute 609.321 subd. 8 (1993) defines a prostitute
as "an individual who engages in prostitution," whereas prostitu-
tion is defined as "engaging or offering or agreeing to engage for
hire in sexual penetration or sexual contact."9 4 Sexual contact is
defined as any of the following acts ("if the acts can reasonably be
construed as being for the purpose of satisfying the actor's sexual
impulses"):
(i) The intentional touching by an individual of a prostitute's
intimate parts; or (ii) The intentional touching by a prostitute
of another individual's intimate parts.95
Sexual penetration, as defined in the statue, means
any of the following acts, if for the purpose of satisfying sexual
impulses: sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal inter-
course, or any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal
openings of an individual's body by any part of another individ-
ual's body or any object used for the purpose of satisfying sexual
impulses. Emission of semen is not necessary.9 6
This statute is problematic for a variety of reasons. The stat-
ute is underinclusive97 in two ways. First, it requires that hiring be
"for the purpose of satisfying sexual impulses."9 8 Second, by focus-
ing on "contact" and "penetration," the statute does not reach a
whole range of activity which would constitute prostitution as it is
commonly understood. If the state's goal is to prohibit the sale of
94. M-NN. STAT. § 609.321, subd. 9 (1993).
95. Id. at subd. 10.
96. Id. at subd. 11.
97. An underinclusive statute is one which fails to fully encompass all those be-
haviors which it purports to prohibit. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2251 (1993), the Supreme Court described an under-
inclusive statute as one which "fails truly to promote its purported compelling inter-
est." The Court noted that a state may not create underinclusive statutes because
"the fact that the allegedly harmful conduct falls outside the statute's scope belies a
governmental assertion that it has genuinely pursued an interest of the highest or-
der." See infra note 99 and accompanying text for specific examples of
underinclusiveness.
98. While the Maita court dealt with this issue by asking for what other purpose
would such behavior be (see supra note 92), it is important to recognize that there
are other reasons why individuals solicit the services of a prostitute. Such reasons
may include anger, the desire to make someone jealous, a 'gift' for someone else, etc.
The reason for procuring a prostitute should not affect the illegality of the activity.
In addition, the adoption of my proposal is made easier by simply removing this
requirement. If courts respond to the requirement with the simple assertion that no
other reasons exists for hiring a prostitute, then the requirement is superfluous.
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women's bodies for sexual favors, it must demonstrate this by draft-
ing a statute which would include all such behavior.
For example, a man who pays a prostitute for her sexual ser-
vice (hereinafter "a john") may hire a woman and ask her to mas-
turbate in his presence. If he merely witnesses this activity,
regardless of his intent, and he does not touch her, nor she him, this
"transaction" has failed to meet the statutory definition of prostitu-
tion. However, it is unlikely that this activity would be viewed as
legal or as non-prostitution. 99 According to the Freeman court, if
this particular john filmed this activity, however, it would be legal.
This is where the weakness of the Freeman argument is clear and
the statute is exposed as underinclusive.
Further, if one hires a prostitute for some non-traditional act
that does not fall into the definition of sexual contact, then even if
this activity is for the purpose of sexual arousal or satisfaction of
one's sexual impulses, it does not fall within the definition of
prostitution.
By removing the requirement of "satisfying the actor's sexual
impulses" the conduct of filming or photographing persons engaged
in sexual activity would clearly fall within the reach of the statute.
Since this element of the statute has already been proven to be
highly problematic, and an element which may or may not be ad-
hered to in actual prosecution of prostitutes and johns,100 the ef-
fects of its removal would only secure the prosecution of those
already within the scope of the statute.
My proposed statute, based on the previously mentioned Min-
nesota Statute,10 1 reads as follows:
99. The lay understanding or conceptualization of prostitution supports this as-
sertion. When Jimmy Swaggart was exposed for his patronage of prostitutes, no one
questioned whether the activities he performed with the woman he hired constituted
prostitution. The exchange of money was the defining characteristic. In fact, the
prostitute, Debra Murphee, testified that Swaggart would "sit in his chair, and he'd
masturbate ... that's about it, most of the time; then he'd lay on his - his money on
the table, and he'd leave." T.V. Preachers to Settle War With Pricey Settlement, CNN
News, Feb. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN File, Transcript #625-5.
This "exchange" would not meet the statutory definition of prostitution, yet the wo-
man involved was still defined as a prostitute, and the man involved accused of solic-
iting the services of a prostitute. Swaggart himself stated that he "paid her to
remove her clothes and masturbate in front of him." Nigel Andrew, Another pray,
another dollar, THE SUNDAY TnMEs, July 22, 1990, § 8, at 3. Since they did not touch
one another, this would not fall within the statutory definition of prostitution. Later,
a prostitute disclosed that Swaggart had "repeatedly photographed her in elabo-
rately staged lewd poses." Michael Castleman, Libidos in Overdrive, Cm. TRi., Jan.
30, 1991, § 7, at 5. This demonstrates how the line between pornography and prosti-
tution is a false construction.
100. See supra footnote 99 for examples of such inconsistent prosecution.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96 for text of current statute.
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1. Prostitute Defined: A prostitute is an individual who en-
gages in prostitution.
2. Prostitution Defined: Prostitution is engaging, or offering,
or agreeing to engage for hire, in sexual contact. Sexual
contact is defined as, but not limited to, any of the following
acts:
(i) The intentional touching by an individual of a prosti-
tute's intimate parts.
(ii) The intentional touching by a prostitute of another in-
dividual's intimate parts.
(iii) Sexual penetration, defined as any of the following
acts: sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal in-
tercourse or any intrusion, however slight, into the
genital or anal openings of an individual's body by any
part of another individual's body or any object used for
purposes of penetration as a substitute for any body
part.
(iv) Watching one masturbate, or masturbating in one's
presence.
(v) Observing two or more individuals engaged in any of
the aforementioned activity.
3. Defenses:
(i) Failure to become aroused or lack of intent to become
aroused when performing or offering or agreeing to
perform any of the above acts for hire does not consti-
tute a defense.
(ii) The fact that any of this conduct may be filmed or pho-
tographed and/or distributed either for personal or
commercial use does not constitute a defense.
This statute is superior to the current Minnesota statute for
three reasons. First, it more accurately encompasses the range of
behaviors constituting sexual contact and thereby avoids the
problems of vagueness' 0 2 and underinclusiveness.1o 3 Second, it
removes the cumbersome requirement that the behavior be for the
purpose of "satisfying the actor's sexual impulses."i0 4 By clearly
stating that the lack of sexual gratification or desire are not de-
fenses, issues of defining or measuring sexual gratification are
avoided. (As previously mentioned, this requirement may or may
not be considered in current prosecution.) Removing that condition
leaves little room for doubt about whether pornographic film-mak-
ing is included: it is clearly within the scope of the statute. Third,
and most obviously, the statute expressly states that filming such
behavior does not exempt it from prosecution. 0 5
102. See supra note 38 for a definition of vagueness.
103. See supra note 97 for an explanation of underinclusiveness.
104. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of this
requirement in the Freeman case.
105. See supra notes 51-93 and accompanying text for an explanation of why the
law supports such action.
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These modifications are not drastic and they are not difficult.
My proposal closes the gap which exists between the "sex for hire"
which is presently legal and that which is not. By doing so, the stat-
ute provides adequate notice to those who may be engaged in the
conduct it describes, while criminalizing those types of pornography
which it encompasses. This statute is not without flaws, as dis-
cussed briefly below, but I believe it circumvents many of the
problems that have made other attempts at regulating pornography
unsuccessful. 106
The opposition's arguments are easy to anticipate. Some will
assert that applying this statute will require the same types of line-
drawingl0 7 that make obscenity0o and nuisance' 09 actions untena-
ble. While I concede that some line-drawing occurs, it is no more
than the legislature has already done, and deemed necessary and
acceptable, under existing prostitution statutes. The definition of
prostitution is itself a "line." Prostitution statutes are not criticized
for being vaguellOor overbroad because it is the exchange of money
that defines the violation. Extending prostitution statutes to in-
clude pornography will also make money the identifying "hook."
Opponents may also argue that such a regulation will impinge
upon mainstream film containing explicit sexual contact. This argu-
ment is simply a different version of the line-drawing argument dis-
cussed above. Prostitution statutes have already drawn lines for
that which occurs off camera. The fact that lines are now being
drawn for that which occurs on camera does not make the statute
problematic for that reason alone.
It is also important to consider whether criminalizing porno-
graphic film will actually make its production more or less likely to
occur. The possibility is real that criminalization will only drive
such work further underground, increasing both demand and the
money involved. However, prostitution is already illegal. The thrust
of my argument is that the lines between what occurs on and off
camera are artificial. This same economic argument has been ad-
vanced by those in favor of decriminalizing prostitution, and re-
jected by our nation's lawmakers. Any debate on this point should
be focused on the sale of women's bodies per se, and should not fo-
106. See supra notes 21-50 and accompanying text for an explanation of unsuc-
cessful attempts at regulation.
107. See supra note 6 for a definition of line-drawing.
108. For a discussion of obscenity and its problems, see supra notes 23-28 and
accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of nuisance actions and their problems, see supra notes 29-
39 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 38 for a definition of vagueness.
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cus on a false distinction between those sales occuring off camera
and those occuring in front it.
Even in light of the previous considerations, this statute is an
improvement over the current law. By clearly stating that a camera
does not protect an otherwise illegal activity, the statute sends a
clear message that a bogus distinction between "protected speech"
and "prostitution" will no longer be maintained. The statute takes
established law prohibiting prostitution and extends it, employing
exactly the same legal reasoning and moral assumptions, to
pornography.
Conclusion
Pornography poses a threat to the safety of those employed in
the industry and to the status of women in this country as a whole.
While there have been varying attempts at regulation of both its
production and distribution, none have made any significant pro-
gress toward its reduction. Women acting in pornographic films are
being paid-legally-to have sex, while women who are paid for sex
outside the scope of film are deemed prostitutes who, by defintion,
break the law.
The law clearly states that paying someone for sex is illegal.
Rather than perpetuating the false distinction between acceptable
and unacceptable "prostitution," my proposal more accurately de-
fines prostitution to include, even in the eyes of the law, porno-
graphic film. Prostitution behind a camera is still prostitution. With
simple modifications to currently existing law, modifications sup-
ported by precedent, we can ensure that the pornography industry
no longer profits from the exploitation and trafficking of women, but
rather is penalized for that very thing.
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